Employers\u27 Right of Access to State Courts: Bill Johnson\u27s Restaurants v. NLRB by Vlamis, Georgia L.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 3 Spring 1984 Article 7 
Employers' Right of Access to State Courts: Bill Johnson's 
Restaurants v. NLRB 
Georgia L. Vlamis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Georgia L. Vlamis, Employers' Right of Access to State Courts: Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 33 
DePaul L. Rev. 611 (1984) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol33/iss3/7 
This Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
EMPLOYERS' RIGHT OF ACCESS TO STATE
COURTS: BILL JOHNSON'S RESTAURANTS V. NLRB
Section 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was designed
to protect employees who file unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) from discrimination by their employer.' Con-
gress intended section 8(a)(4) to be construed broadly so that employees would
not be inhibited from reporting employer interference with protected activities
to the NLRB.2 An employer's lawsuit against an employee, brought in bad
faith to retaliate for filing a charge with the NLRB, exemplifies conduct
which Congress sought to prohibit by enacting section 8(a)(4).3
When an employer files a lawsuit against an employee in state court, the
NLRB has the authority to seek an injunction in a federal district court
to enjoin the state court's proceedings if the state suit amounts to an unfair
1. Section 8(a)(4) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee becpause he has filed charges or given testimony
under this subchapter.
U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976). Congress established the NLRB to protect the rights of employees
which are guaranteed by the NLRA. The NLRB is comprised of five members appointed by
the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Each member
serves a five-year term. For a detailed discussion on the origin and structure of the NLRB,
see J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1974).
Section 10 of the NLRA authorizes the NLRB to prevent both employers and employees
from engaging in unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
. The NLRA also protects other employee rights from employer interference. For example,
§ 7, the key provision of the NLRA, recognizes the employees' right to organize, the right
to bargain with the employer for a collective agreement and the right to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining. Id. at § 157. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.
In order to protect the rights granted to employees by § 7, § 8(a) of the NLRA bans
employer labor practices which infringe on these rights. Id. at § 158(a). If the employer violates
any of these sections, the NLRB can invoke sanctions. Id. at § 160.
2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121 (1972). In Scrivener, the Court recog-
nized that Congress intended for employees to feel free from coercion when reporting any possible
unfair labor practices to the NLRB. Id. (quoting Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S.
235, 238 (1967)).
3. See, e.g., Power Systems, Inc., 39 N.L.R.B. 445 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d
936 (7th Cir. 1979). In Power Systems, the NLRB found that the employer lacked a reasonable
basis for filing the lawsuit. The NLRB observed that the employer's motive in filing the suit
was to punish his employees for filing charges with the NLRB. 39 N.L.R.B. at 450. Further-
more, the NLRB noted that the employer sought to discourage and interfere with his employees'
right of access to the NLRB. Id. The court of appeals, however, refused to enforce the NLRB's
order because the record did not support the finding that the lawsuit lacked a reasonable basis.
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labor practice.' No single test, however, has been applied consistently to
determine when an employer's lawsuit against an employee amounts to an
unfair labor practice.' Some courts have applied a motive test to judge the
propriety of an employer's suit.' Under this motive test, courts have ruled
that if the employer's motive was to retaliate against employees, filing the
suit violated section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA. Improper motive was the sole
element that had to be proven for the NLRB to dismiss the employer's
lawsuit.7 Other courts, however, have rejected this rationale and applied their
own ad hoc tests. For example, the Second Circuit held that even if an
employer possessed an improper motive when he filed a lawsuit against his
employees, "this alone would not make resort to the courts unlawful so
For further discussion of Power Systems see infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. See
also Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 108 (1960) (employer's implied threat to file suit
violates the NLRA if intended to restrain employees in exercise of their federally protected rights).
An employer who files a retaliatory lawsuit may also violate § 8(a)(l) because the lawsuit
may interfere with the employees' right to organize and engage in other concerted activities.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
4. The NLRB is empowered by 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1976) to seek an injunction from a
federal district court to enjoin unfair labor practices. The United States Supreme Court held
in NLRB v. Nash-Finch, 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971), that § 1600) gives the Board the implied
authority to seek to enjoin state court proceedings when federal authority preempts the field.
The courts have balanced the federal and state interests to determine whether a state court
may assume jurisdiction over a case which collaterally relates to a labor dispute. A state court
will not be permitted to exercise its jurisdiction if that exercise would interfere with federal
regulation. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 300 (1977);
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 249 N.L.R.B. 155, enforced, 660 F.2d 1335 (9th
Cir. 1981), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983).
In Bill Johnson, for example, the NLRB dismissed the employer's state suit because of
potential interference with the NLRB's administration of the NLRA. 249 N.L.R.B. at 168.
The NLRB noted that the employer's suit would interfere with the NLRB's administration of
the NLRA because the NLRB did not have the proper authority to limit the state's broad
discovery procedures. Id. The NLRB's discovery rules are more restrictive than those of state
courts in order to protect witnesses and avoid the costs and time involved in a full discovery
procedure. Id. This purpose would be defeated, the NLRB noted, if an employer filed a state
lawsuit and thereby gained access to liberal state discovery rules. Id. In Bill Johnson, therefore,
the NLRB concluded that the employer's suit would interfere with the NLRB's administration
of the NLRA by allowing the employer to take advantage of the state's broad discovery rules. Id.
5. See, e.g., United Stanford Employees, Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977) (NLRB focused
on plaintiff's objective for filing suit), enforced, 601 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979); Television
Wis., Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 722, 722 n.2 (1976) (union's lawsuit was improper "not because of
the Union's subjective intent but because of the unla ,ful objective sought by the Union");
Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1960) (holding that the NLRB would not interfere
with an employer filing a state action even if the suit was "part of a bad-faith scheme to
defeat union organization").
6. See, e.g., United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc. v. NLRB, 242 N.L.R.B. 921, enforced,
643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.) (suit filed as a result of employer's anti-union attitude constituted
an unfair labor practice), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981); Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB,
601 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1979) (improper motive inferred if suit lacks a reasonable basis);
see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 556, 561 (8th Cir. 1980) (stating
that an employer's or union's intent in filing suit is not relevant to determine the propriety
of a lawsuit).
7. See, e.g., United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, enforced, 643 F.2d
1017, 1026 (4th Cir.) (court enforced NLRB order requiring the employer to halt its suit against
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as to justify an unfair labor practice finding. '
The conflict that existed in the past among the circuits in deciding which
test to apply was recently resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB. 9 In that decision, the Supreme
Court established a standard that requires the NLRB to permit state courts
to adjudicate even retaliatory lawsuits, unless the lawsuit lacks a "reasonable
basis."'" The Court essentially rejected the earlier motive test, under which
the employer's motive, rather than the reasonableness of the suit, determined
whether or not the NLRB could dismiss the prosecution of a state court
lawsuit." Further, the Court's analysis suggested a standard for determining
what constitutes a "reasonable basis": if the NLRB determines that the
employer's complaint contains "genuine issues of material fact," then the
NLRB must halt its own proceeding and await the adjudication of the state
claim.' 2 If, however, the suit is found to contain no "genuine issues of fact,"
the NLRB may proceed and preempt the state court's right to rule on the
matter. ' I
In reaching this decision, the Court recognized that, after Bill Johnson,
employees might be inhibited from participating in certain protected activities
for fear that they might be sued by their employer. " Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that the right of an employer to seek judicial protection in labor
disputes may not always be preempted by federal labor law. ' Thus, the Court
balanced two opposing interests: the employer's right of access to the courts
and the employee's right to engage in activities protected by the NLRA
without interference or harassment from his employer.
After examining prior decisions in this area, this Recent Case will analyze
the Court's decision in Bill Johnson and emphasize the importance of allowing
an employee because it was in reaction to the employee's resort to the NLRB), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 994 (1981); Power Systems, Inc., 293 N.L.R.B. 445, enforcement denied, 601 F.2d
936 (7th Cir. 1979); George A. Angle v. NLRB, 242 N.L.R.B. 744, 748 (employer's suit for
malicious prosecution against his employee was dismissed because the employer's suit was in
retaliation for his employee participating in the NLRB's contempt proceedings), enforced, 683
F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1979).
8. Lodge 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. United Aircraft Corp..,
534 F.2d 422, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976). For a discussion of
other cases in which employers are allowed access to the courts despite retaliatory motives,
see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
9. 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983).
10. Id. at 2170.
11. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
12. 103 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
13. Id.
14. Section 7 of the NLRA describes certain rights of employees. See supra note 1. Sections
8(a)(1) through (5) of the NLRA further protect the employee by prohibiting violations of an
employee's § 7 rights. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(l)-(5) (1976).
15. 103 S. Ct. 2169. The Bill Johnson Court stated that "[t]he right of access to a court
is too important to be called an unfair labor practice solely on the ground that what is sought
in court is to enjoin employees from exercising a protected right." Id. (quoting Peddie Bdgs.,
203 N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973), enforcement denied on other grounds, NLRB v. Visceglia, 498
F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1974)).
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the NLRB broad discretion in resolving disputes involving labor and manage-
ment. A detailed analysis of the decision leads to the conclusion that the
Bill Johnson Court properly employed an equitable balancing approach to
reach a just result that respects the rights of both parties.
BACKGROUND
The NLRA proscribes employer conduct that infringes upon certain
employee rights and authorizes the NLRB to enforce those rights.' 6 In en-
acting the NLRA, Congress intended to create a national labor policy which
would unify the state laws that had previously regulated labor relations. Con-
gress viewed exclusive authority over labor-management matters to be
necessary for the NLRB to implement a unified labor policy." Nevertheless,
after the passage of the NLRA, situations arose in which state courts ad-
judicated matters arguably within the NLRB's jurisdiction.'" In some in-
stances, state courts were directly prohibited from regulating any conduct
that was under the NLRB's jurisdiction.' 9 Yet, in other instances, particularly
where Congress has not specifically barred state proceedings dealing with
certain conduct, the courts have allowed the state proceedings to continue.2"
In determining what conduct the states may regulate, the Supreme Court
has recognized an individual's right of access to the courts under the first
16. See supra note I and accompanying text.
17. Federal preemption of state matters affecting federal labor law, therefore, is necessary
to achieve a uniform labor policy. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485,
498-99 (1953). In Garner, the Court articulated its reasons for preempting such state matters.
The Garner Court stated that Congress intended for the NLRB, a centralized administrative
agency, to implement the NLRA by applying uniform standards, procedures, and remedies
when deciding labor law issues. The Court further noted that a uniform application of standards
would avoid conflicting decisions that would likely arise if each state applied its own local
procedures. Id. at 498-99; see infra note 37. For an overview on the preemption of state labor
law, see generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 916-17
(1981).
18. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978). In Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Court recognized that the picketing involved
was, in the absence of a trespass, protected by § 7 of the NLRA. Id. at 204. The Court
noted that it was "arguable" whether the peaceful picketing, which was trespassory, was pro-
tected. Id. at 205. The Court, however, held that the state court could decide the trespass
suit because the picketing would not interfere with conduct which the NLRB might deem to
be protected. The Court reasoned that trespass is more likely to be "unprotected than pro-
tected." Id. at 205. But cf. Capital Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). In Capital
Service, an employer obtained a state court injunction against a union, in addition to filing
an unfair labor practice charge against the union based on the same conduct. The Court held
that the NLRB had authority to halt state court actions which interfere with NLRB proceedings
in violation of § 8(a)(4) of the NLRA. Id. at 504.
19. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 295 (1977)
(citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1967)); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
20. See, e.g., United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
In this case the Court upheld a state's award for injuries incurred due to the tortious conduct
of a union agent. The agent had threatened violence against the company's employees if they
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amendment." Some lower courts have adopted the position that an employer's
right to seek judicial relief should not be denied, even if the employer
possessed the discriminatory motive of retaliating against employees for the
exercise of their rights under the NLRA." Although an employer has a right
of access to the courts, this right is not absolute. 3 When lawsuits are filed
in furtherance of an unlawful objective, such as retaliation against employees
for exercising protected rights, this right of access is limited."
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of an
employer's right of access to a state court to file a suit against an employee
in Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB.S In Power Systems, John Sanford filed
numerous charges with the NLRB and OSHA after being discharged by
Power Systems for failing to perform his duties. 6 All charges were dismissed
failed to join the union. Id. at 664. The Court noted that if the state was preempted from
adjudicating the claim, the union agent would be shielded from liability for his wrongful con-
duct. Id.; accord Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61-62 (1966);
Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958).
21. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
• . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. 1. Courts have consistently interpreted this provision to include the right
of access to the courts. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 510 (1972) ("The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of
petition."). For a discussion of California Motor Transport, see Fishel, Antitrust Liability for
Attempts to Influence Government Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977). See also United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S.
576, 585 (1971) ("meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protection
of the First Amendment"); Clyde Taylor Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103 (1960) (employer's right of
access to the courts cannot be denied unless it is clear that the "employer's resort to the civil
courts [is] a tactic calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of their rights under the
NLRA").
22. See, e.g., S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977) (no unfair labor practice
found when an employer filed a $50,000 libel suit against an employee, even though the libel
claim was found to have no basis); see also Peddie Bldgs., 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973),
enforcement denied on other grounds, 498 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1974) ("The right of access to
a court is too important to be called an unfair labor practice solely on the ground that what
is sought in the court is to enjoin employees from exercising a protected right."); Clyde Taylor
Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 121 (1960) (despite the ALJ's finding that the employer's suit had
the improper motive of restraining employees from exercising their § 7 rights, NLRB refused
to find an unfair labor practice).
23. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("There is no constitu-
tional value in false statements of fact"); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972) (no first amendment right of access if lawsuit is a "mere sham"
and filed to harass competitors).
24. See, e.g., International Org. of Masters, Mates, and Pilots, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626 (1976)
(because ALJ found that union action was only "a stratagem to mask [its] real intent," NLRB
found union's lawsuit to have been filed in furtherance of an unlawful objective, and thus
unprotected); see also United Standford Employees Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977), en-
forced, 601 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979) (suit to enforce illegal union membership was denied);
Television Wis., Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976) (union's lawsuit improper because of union's
invalid security clause).
25. 239 N.L.R.B. 445 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
26. 239 N.L.R.B. at 445-46.
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by the NLRB due to lack of evidence.27 Subsequently, Power Systems filed
suit against Sanford after discovering that he had filed forty-six separate
unfair labor practice charges against his former employers and labor unions.28
The NLRB ordered Power Systems to cease and desist from prosecuting its
state claim against John Sanford because its lawsuit lacked reasonable grounds
and had been motivated by anti-union sentiments.29 In addition, the NLRB
ordered Power Systems to compensate Sanford for all his legal expenses."
If there had been sufficient evidence of improper motive, the Seventh Cir-
cuit would have enforced the NLRB's order.3 The Court of Appeals stated,
however, that there was not "substantial evidence" 32 on the record to imply
that the employer's suit was prompted by an improper motive, and hence,
refused to enforce the NLRB order.33 In subsequent cases, the NLRB has
adopted the rule established in Power Systems and has held that an employer
who filed a civil action against its employee with a retaliatory motive has
violated section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA.3"
Regardless of which test a court applies, the employer's suit must be en-
joined if it pertains to an area of law that has been preempted by federal
labor law. 5 For example, in the 1953 case of San Diego Building Trades
27. Id.
28. Id. at 446. Thirty of these cases were against labor organizations and the remaining
16 were against Sanford's former employers.
29. It appears that the NLRB will infer that reasonable grounds for the suit exist if an
employer's suit is not filed with the intent to restrain employees from exercising their protected
rights. Id. at 449.
30. Id. at 451.
31. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1979).
32. Id. at 940.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 778-80 (1981)
(meritless suit); United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 925-26 (1979) (fraud),
enforced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981); George A. Angle, 242
N.L.R.B. 744 (1979) (malicious prosecution), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982).
35. To determine whether a state civil suit is preempted, the courts rely on statutory con-
struction to ascertain congressional intent. State court jurisdiction of a civil action will not
be preempted if it is evident that Congress did not intend to regulate the particular matter
in dispute. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971).
State regulation will not be preempted if Congress has not yet acted with respect to the state's
right to regulate the labor activity in question.
Earlier preemption decisions suggested that if congressional intent was ambiguous regarding
state authority to regulate a particular area, then there was a presumption in favor of the
state regulation. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S.
767, 778 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (if the NLRB is unable to effectuate the policies
of the NLRA, then states should have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal government in
regulating labor relations); see also Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 547 (1945) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (states should be allowed to regulate labor related areas if Congress has not
provided or supplemented its own regulation in the area). For a discussion of the doctrine
of federal preemption, see generally TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-401 (1978)
and for an historical perspective of federal preemption in the field of labor relations, see generally
Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REv. 1057,
1058-59 (1958).
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Council v. Garmon, 6 the Supreme Court established the principle that since
cases which involve activities protected or prohibited by the NLRA fall within
the "primary jurisdiction" of the NLRB, states are preempted from
adjudicating such cases."7 The Court stated, however, that if the regulated
conduct is of "peripheral concern" to the NLRA or involves "interests deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility," the state has an interest in pro-
viding judicial remedies that override federal interest in a uniform labor
policy.8
Certain types of conduct are neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA.
A leading case addressing such conduct is Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers, Local 114.'9 The Linn Court held that Congress had not preempted
state courts from exercising jurisdiction over certain libel actions which arise
in labor disputes.'" The Court noted that a state has a proper interest in
protecting its citizens from libel in a labor context if the libel suit does not
interfere with the administration of federal labor policy." The Linn Court's
holding was narrow and limited recovery to those cases where the allegedly
libelous statements were made with malice and caused actual harm.' 2 Yet
in cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress,' malicious
prosecution," intimidation,"' and other tort actions,' 6 states also have been
36. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
37. Id. at 245. The NLRB has interpreted the NLRA as being subject to limited judicial
review. In some instances, the United States Supreme Court has ordered states to yield to the
NLRB if a state decision might conflict with federal labor policy. The Garmon Court noted
the importance of allowing the NLRB the power to determine the "preciseand closely limited
demarcations between federal and state jurisdiction over concerted activities" in the area of
labor law. Id.
38. Id. at 243-44.
39. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
40. Id. at 64-65. In Linn, an assistant manager of a detective agency brought a libel suit
to recover damages which-resulted from the distribution of defamatory leaflets during a union
campaign. Id. at 56. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of the case on the grounds that the subject matter was exclusively within the NLRB's
jurisdiction. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 337 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964).
41. 383 U.S. at 67. The Linn Court stated that, in the case of libel, "the exercise of state
jurisdiction would be a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act,
provided it is limited to redressing libel issued with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless
disregard of whether it was true or false." Id. at 61. This reasoning was based on the conclu-
sion that states have a compelling interest in protecting their citizens from libel. Id.
42. The Court adopted the standards established in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), which require that the statements be made with "actual malice" or "with knowledge
of their falsity" in order to be found defamatory. 383 U.S. at 65.
43. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
44. See, e.g., George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744, enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982).
45. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
46. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954) (interference with business); Allen-Bradley Local II v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 748 (1942) (mass picketing).
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allowed to retain their jurisdiction. Thus, with respect to tort claims, federal
courts previously had recognized that state courts were not entirely preempted
by the NLRA.47
Outside of these few cases, important questions remained regarding other
preemption concerns."8 Until Bill Johnson, no case had addressed the ques-
tions regarding the legality of the motives for bringing the suit, the remedy
for a baseless suit, or whether state or federal courts should determine the
reasonableness of the suit. The Supreme Court confronted these problems
in Bill Johnson and established a standard creating a uniform federal policy
with respect to civil actions arising in the context of a labor dispute.
THE BILL JOHNSON DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
Ruth Helton worked at Bill Johnson's Big Apple East, a restaurant in
Phoenix, Arizona, which is owned and operated by Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc. Helton was one of the top waitresses in seniority."9 In early
August 1978, she attempted to organize a union, but was discharged as a
result of her activities. 0 On September 20, 1978, Helton filed an unfair labor
47. The Bill Johnson Court stated, in a footnote, that federal preemption was not an issue
in Bill Johnson. 103 S. Ct. at 2167 n.5. Nevertheless, the Court in its analysis analogized to
other cases involving situations where state and federal concerns were in opposition. See Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978); Linn v. United
Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). The Supreme Court in Linn and Sears,
Roebuck & Co. applied a balancing test to determine whether federal preemption rules should
apply. In both cases the Court held that the state had a compelling interest in deciding matters
affecting the safety and welfare of its citizens, espeltially in the absence of any clear congres-
sional direction to the contrary.
The Bill Johnson Court applied a similar test whereby it balanced the opposing state and
federal interests. Thus, it seems anomalous that the Bill Johnson Court stated that federal
preemption rules were inapplicable in this case. The Court, in fact, engaged in a balancing
test to specifically determine whether the federal interest of developing a uniform labor policy
should preempt the state's interest in providing its citizens with a judicial forum. 103 S. Ct.
at 2169-70. Despite the Court's refusal to acknowledge that Bill Johnson involved a preemption
issue, the court actually applied a preemption-type analysis in reaching its decision.
48. The Bill Johnson Court also noted that the Nash-Finch doctrine, allowing the NLRB
to enjoin state proceedings if the NLRB has preempted the field, did not apply in this case.
103 S. Ct. at 2167 n.5. In NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971), the Court held
that, even if no unfair labor practice charge is pending before the NLRB, it can sue in federal
court to enjoin a state court action. Thus, the Nash-Finch Court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 2283,
which prohibits private parties from petitioning federal courts to enjoin state proceedings, was
inapplicable in situations where the NLRB filed suit to prevent unfair labor practices. 404 U.S.
at 146. In spite of the Court's comment in Bill Johnson regarding Nash-Finch, the Court never
stated why Nash-Finch was inapplicable to Bill Johnson.
49. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 249 N.L.R.B. 155, 157 (1980).
50. Id. On July 25, 1978, the Vice President called a meeting to inform the employees
of new, stricter company rules regarding days off and phone calls. He stated that a violation
of the rules would result in termination of employment. A few days following the speech,
Helton discussed with other employees the possibility of forming a union. Id.
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practice charge with the NLRB alleging that she had been illegally terminated
because of her attempts to organize a union."
The same day that she filed the charge, Helton and three other waitresses
picketed the restaurant and urged customers to boycott the restaurant, com-
plaining that management treated the waitresses unfairly.,' A manager of
the restaurant approached the picketers and told them that he would "get
even" with them." In addition to the picketing, the restaurant employees
distributed leaflets charging management with making "unwarranted sexual
advances" toward the female employees, and with failing to maintain clean
restrooms for employees." The leaflet also stated that the unfair labor prac-
tice charge was pending against Bill Johnson's Restaurants."
In response to these activities, the management filed a civil complaint in
an Arizona state court against the employees. The complaint alleged that
the leaflets contained libelous statements which were published with a
malicious intent to harm management. 6 Additional allegations included mass
picketing, violence, and trespass." The restaurant sought compensatory and
punitive damages in addition to a temporary restraining order to stop the
picketing and leafleting.58 In response to management's suit, Helton filed
a second charge with the NLRB, claiming that the suit was filed in retalia-
tion for her having brought charges under the NLRA.' 9
An administrative law judge (ALJ) heard the case on September 27, 1979.
The ALJ relied on the Power Systems case and ruled that the employer did
not have a reasonable basis for its libel suit. The ALJ, therefore, inferred
that the employer had the improper motive of punishing the employees for
51. Id. at 158.
52. Id. at 160.
53. Id. at 161. In addition, Gene Johnson, one of the restaurant owners, phoned one of
the waitresses, Cheryl Nichols, at home and requested to speak with her husband. Johnson
asked Nichols's husband why he and his wife had been picketing the restaurant. Nichols's hus-
band replied that they were protesting Helton's discharge. Johnson then said to Nichols's hus-
band that he would hate to see the Nicholses "get hurt by all this and lose their new home."
Id. at 162.
54. Id. at 162. The leaflet also listed the following waitresses' complaints: eight hour shifts
with no breaks; no overtime pay allowed even though the waitresses were not allowed to leave
until their last customer had left; the threat of discharge if they failed to appear for work
over the Christmas holidays or due to illness; and inconsistent management practices. Id.
55. Id. The leaflet specifically stated: "THE [NLRB] HAS ISSUED A COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE BIG APPLE RESTAURANT . ..FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES."
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. Following a hearing, the state court refused to enjoin the leafleting, but did grant
the temporary restraining order to stop the picketing. Id.
59. Id. at 156. The NLRB issued its second complaint against the restaurant claiming that
the filing of the restaurant's suit constituted a violation of § 8(a)(4) of the NLRA. Id. The
NLRB found that the restaurant's suit discriminated against the employees for reporting infor-
mation to the NLRB. Id. at 169. Additionally, the NLRB held that the restaurant violated
§ 8(a)(l) of the NLRA because the restaurant had interferred with the exercise of the employees'
protected rights. Id.
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filing charges with the NLRB.60 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the
restaurant had committed seven unfair labor practices, including violations
of sections 8(a)(1) and (4)." Upon review, the NLRB essentially adopted
the ALJ's decision.62 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the NLRB's decision. 63
The Supreme Court's Decision
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 to determine whether
the NLRB could properly enjoin the prosecution of a state court libel suit
which was filed in retaliation for an employee's filing of an unfair labor
practice charge. In a majority opinion written by Justice White, the Supreme
Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion. 6 The Court concluded that a show-
ing of bad motive alone was insufficient to justify enjoining the state court
suit. 66 The Supreme Court held that for the NLRB to enjoin a state court
suit, the plaintiff's suit must lack a reasonable basis in addition to having
a retaliatory motive. 6
According to the Court, the NLRB is to determine whether the employer's
suit has a "reasonable basis." 68 The Court, however, established the criteria
by which the NLRB is to decide whether a "reasonable basis" exists. The
NLRB must first determine whether there are "genuine issues of material
fact" in the case.6 9 If factual or legal issues exist, the NLRB must stay its
proceedings until the state court proceedings are concluded.7" If the NLRB
stays its proceedings and the state court's decision is against the employer,
the NLRB may then take the state decision into account in determining
whether or not the employer violated the NLRA.1' But, if the employer's
suit contains no genuine factual or legal issues, the NLRB may dismiss the
60. Id. at 165. The ALJ, adopted the reasoning of Power Systems, and found that the
employer's lawsuit was an attempt to punish Helton for filing charges with the NLRB and
also to punish the other defendants for helping Helton. Id. at 169-70.
61. Id. at 168-69.
62. Id.
63. 660 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit stated that the employer did not offer
substantial evidence to support the NLRB's finding that the statements were published with
malice; instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the restaurant's motive in filing the suit was
to retaliate and intimidate its employees, and discourage the organization of a union. Id. at 1343.
64. 103 S. Ct. 253 (1982).
65. 103 S. Ct. at 2173.
66. Id. at 2170.
67. Id. at 2173.
68. Id. at 2171-72.
69. Id. The Court stated that in situations where legal or factual issues exist, the plaintiff
has a compelling first amendment right to allow a state jury to decide these issues. Thus, the
Court concluded that the state's interest in protecting its citizens should be free from NLRB
interference. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2172. If, however, the employer convinces the state court that his suit is
"meritorious," then his filing of the state civil suit is not an unfair labor practice. Id.
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state suit and use the lack of basis for the suit as evidence of improper
motive in filing the suit, thereby demonstrating a violation of section 8(a)(4)
of the NLRA.72 The Court suggested that the NLRB, in making its deter-
mination, apply the standards traditionally used in evaluating motions for
summary judgment and directed verdict to determine the reasonableness of
the suit.73
In reaching its decision, the Court limited the NLRB's broad discretion
over matters arising in labor management relations to determining whether
the state suit has a "reasonable basis," rather than deciding the merits of
the suit.7" Further, the Court acknowledged that sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(4)
of the NLRA have been interpreted broadly to protect employee activity
so that employees will not be inhibited from exercising their rights to unionize
and engage in other concerted activity." These broad interpretations of the
NLRA are consistent with the NLRB's policy of encouraging complete
freedom of access to the NLRB for any prospective grievance and prohibiting
employer interference with that right of access.7
The Court recognized that an employer's lawsuit against employees can
be used as "a powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation." 77 Employees
who exercise federally protected rights may be exposing themselves to burden-
some litigation." This is especially true, the Court noted, in cases where
the suit is against employees who do not have the support of a union.79
Despite this potential burden on employees, the Court recognized that
employers are entitled to their first amendment right of access to the courts.8"
72. Id. at 2172 n.12.
73. Id. at 2171 n.Ilt. The Court suggested that the NLRB may use the summary judgment
and directed verdict standards for guidance when determining the existence of a reasonable
basis for a lawsuit. The Court, however, left the particular procedures to be employed to the
NLRB's discretion. Id.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment determinations.
Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine material issues of fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Directed verdicts are
governed by rule 50 of the Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure. The grant of a directed verdict
is appropriate only when it is clear that reasonable men could come to but one conclusion
from the evidence. Coffy v. Multi-County Narcotics Bureau, 600 F.2d 570, 579 (6th Cir. 1979).
74. 103 S. Ct at 2171. The Court noted that the ALJ did not have the authority to consider
the merits of the employer's claim. The Court suggested that on remand the ALJ should only
determine whether genuine issues of fact exist regarding the truthfulness of the statements con-
tained in the leaflet. Id. at 2173. The Court also noted that the ALJ should make the same
limited inquiry into the employer's business interference charges. Id.
75. Id. at 2168, 2169 n.9.
76. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (con-
gressional intent was to "prevent the Board's channels of information from being dried up
by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and witnesses"); Briggs Mfg. Co., 75
N.L.R.B. 569, 570-71 (1947) (the objective of § 8(a)(4) is "to assure an effective administration
of the [NLRA] by providing immunity to those who initiate or assist the Board in proceedings
under the [NLRA]").
77. 103 S. Ct. at 2169.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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The Court reasoned that the mere filing of an unfair labor practice charge
should not allow the NLRB to interfere with an individual's first amend-
ment right of access to the courts or to halt the prosecution of a lawsuit
that has a "reasonable basis."" Thus, in order to protect the employer's
right of access to the courts, the Court concluded that the NLRB can only
dismiss a suit if it lacks a reasonable basis. Justice White, writing for the
unanimous Court, stated that even if an employer uses a state court lawsuit
as a rataliatory weapon, the NLRB may not dismiss the suit unless it is
"knowingly frivolous." 8 The Court analogized to the premption exception
recognized in Garmon which allowed state courts to proceed in cases that
involved conduct which affected interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and
responsibility."' 3 In such cases, courts have repeatedly allowed an employer
to seek judicial relief in a state court.' For example, the Bill Johnson Court
reaffirmed its holding in Linn that an employer can seek state court relief
and recover damages in a libel action arising in the context of a labor dispute
if malice and actual injury are proven.'
To resolve the conflicting state and federal interests, the Court engaged
in a balancing test which weighed the state's interest in providing a forum
for its citizens against the federal interest of promoting a uniform federal
labor policy.' 6 The Bill Johnson Court held that this type of analysis is only
applicable in situations where the state court suit has a reasonable basis. 7
81. 103 S. Ct. at 2169.
82. Id. at 2170.
83. Id. at 2169 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959));
see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass suit brought by employer in state court was found to contain
a compelling local interest so that state civil suit was not preempted); Farmer v. United Bhd.
of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (potential for interference created by a state
civil suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a union for engaging in tortious
and outrageous conduct in its discriminatory implementation of hiring hall obligations is "in-
sufficient to counterbalance the legitimate and substantial interest of the state in protecting
its citizens").
85. 103 S. Ct. at 2169 (citing Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)).
The Linn Court adopted the test established in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), requiring proof of actual malice to be shown in a libel action. 383 U.S. at 65.
86. 103 S. Ct. at 2170.
87. Id. The Court stated that suits which lack a reasonable basis are not awarded first
amendment protection. According to the Court, the states have very little interest in adjudicating
frivolous claims. Therefore, the Court concluded that under these circumstances, the federal
interest in protecting employees' rights under the national labor policy should prevail. Id.
In addition to balancing state and federal interests, the Court engaged in another test which
weighed two opposing first amendment rights. The employer's first amendment right of access
to the courts was in direct opposition to the employee's first amendment right of free speech.
Id. The Court noted that the employee's right of free speech is not protected if the speech
is defamatory. Id. The Court relied on Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) (no first
amendment privilege of freedom of the press where defamed party seeks to elicit information
relevant to his suit), and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (false factual
statements are not awarded constitutional protection), to conclude that " baseless litigation
is not immunized by the First Amendment." 103 S. Ct. at 2161.
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The employer's right to prosecute a state claim, however, is outweighed by
the federal interest in promoting a uniform labor policy if the suit is found
to lack a reasonable basis.8" The Court left the determination of
reasonableness of the employer's suit to the NLRB's discretion. 8 If the suit
is found to contain a reasonable basis, the employer may then exercise its
first amendment right of access to the courts."0
The Concurrence
Justice Brennan agreed with the Court's conclusion that Congress had not
intended for the NLRB to be able to dismiss a state lawsuit, even though
filed with an illegal motive, if it had not been preempted by federal law. 9'
Justice Brennan, however, disagreed with the Court's focus on the NLRA.92
According to Justice Brennan, the real issue in the case was one of judicial
review rather than statutory interpretation. He noted that Congress intended
for the NLRB to be subjected to limited judicial review.93 Thus, the Court's
emphasis should have been whether the NLRB's determination of a
"reasonable basis" was "sufficiently reasonable to be accepted by a review-
ing court" instead of developing a standard to determine what constitutes
a "reasonable basis.""
Although Justice Brennan agreed with the "reasonable basis" test developed
by the Court, he stated that the NLRB has broad discretion in controlling
the use of an employer's right of access to the courts as a "powerful instru-
ment of coercion or retaliation.""' Justice Brennan acknowledged that because
Congress intended for the NLRB to decide a wide range of issues affecting
labor policy, the scope of the NLRB's reviewing power is extremely broad. 6
To ascertain whether Congress, under the NLRA, authorized the NLRB to
intervene and preempt a state's right to adjudicate factual and legal issues,
Justice Brennan developed a three part analysis. He stated that the NLRB
should be able to prevent the prosecution of a state lawsuit if, in addition
to the elements required to establish a particular unfair labor practice, (1)
federal law would bar the plaintiff from obtaining relief; (2) state law would
denounce the case as being "frivolous"; or (3) no jury would be able to
88. 103 S. Ct. at 2170.
89. Id. at 2171; see supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
90. 103 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
91. Id. at 2175 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Labor Bd. v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S.
87, 96 (1957)); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). In
Phelps, the Court stated that Congress established an administrative agency, the NLRB, with
expertise in the labor law field to resolve matters between labor and management. Moreover,
the Court stressed the importance of a limited judicial review over NLRB decisions. The Phelps
Court cautioned courts not to exceed their authority and interfere with the NLRB's ruling upon
reviewing the NLRB's order. Id.
94. 103 S. Ct. at 2174 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981)).
95. Id. at 2177 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2175 (Brennan, J., concurring); see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
find in the plaintiff's favor under the applicable law." Justice Brennan con-
cluded that only in circumstances where the NLRB clearly has overstepped
its authority or failed to follow its own procedures should a court intervene
and specify the standards to be followed."8
ANALYSIS
Prior to Bill Johnson, the circuits were in conflict over which test should
be employed to deteimine whether an employer's lawsuit should be dismissed
when it is filed in a state court against employees during a labor dispute. 9
To resolve this conflict, the Bill Johnson Court developed a new test and
rejected the Power Systems test.' The Court rejected the Power Systems
test because it overlooked the important consideration of an employer's first
amendment right of access to the courts.'0 ' Before a state suit will be dis-
missed under the Court's new approach, the NLRB must find, in addition
to a retaliatory motive, that the employer's lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis.0 2
This "reasonable basis" test allows the NLRB to make a general inquiry
with respect to whether the employer's lawsuit raises factual and legal issues.' 3
The Court's approach in-allowing the NLRB broad discretion in making
"reasonable basis" determinations concerning employers' lawsuits promotes
the development of a uniform labor policy.' 04 The NLRB, and not the courts,
has the primary responsibility for matters affecting the nation's labor policy. 05
Limiting the NLRB's power is harmful to labor policy because it restricts
NLRB protection of employee rights guaranteed by the NLRA.1'0 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court has favored limited judicial review of NLRB
decisions.'10 Thus, the Bill Johnson Court correctly observed that the plenary
power of the NLRB is required to implement a unified labor policy.
97. 103 S. Ct. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (courts should not intrude
in administrative agency proceedings to impose their own views regarding the format and pro-
cedure to be followed when determining the merits of a case)).
99. See supra notes 6-8, 24 and accompanying text.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2168. The Court noted that the NLRB had applied the Power Systems
test since 1978. See Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 778-80 (1981);
George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744 (1979), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982); United
Credit Bureau of Am., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 926 (1979), enforced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981).
101. 103 S. Ct. at 2169; see supra note 15.
102. 103 S. Ct. at 2173. The Court stated that "[r]etaliatory motive and lack of reasonable
basis are both essential prerequisites to the issuance of a cease and desist order against a state
suit." Id.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 17, 37 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes I, 4, 17, 37, 93 and accompanying text.
106. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1959); Garner
v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
107. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266-67 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963); Labor Bd. v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957);
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Justice Brennan's concurrence also recognized the NLRB's role in effec-
tuating a federal labor policy. His approach would allow virtually complete
deference to the NLRB in determining the reasonableness of a suit.'", In
a more extensive analysis than that provided by Justice White, Justice Bren-
nan attempted to provide the NLRB with guidelines for balancing state and
federal interests. Justice Brennan agreed with the Court that a suit may be
dismissed if no "genuine issues" exist, but also included two other grounds
for dismissal.' 9 According to Justice Brennan, the state lawsuit also should
be dismissed if it is preempted by federal law"' or if, under the relevant
state law, the claim would be frivolous.'"
Justice Brennan's approach appears to cover more situations in which it
would be desirable to allow dismissal of a state suit. Therefore, Justice Bren-
nan's analysis is more valuable than Justice White's because it specifically
outlines the circumstances in which state suits may be properly dismissed
by the NLRB. Additionally, unlike Justice White, Justice Brennan stressed
the importance of deferring to the NLRB in labor-management matters." 2
This deference is crucial to the proper implementation of the nation's labor
policy because it allows for one national body to make the decisions rather
than a number of courts with limited jurisdiction.
If the state courts were allowed to assume jurisdiction over labor-
management matters, it is conceivable that state and local interests would
be adverse to the national interest." ' Justice Brennan's approach appears
to be the best way to avoid this problem because it would promote a unified
labor policy by deferring labor related matters to the NLRB. Finally,
Justice Brennan appropriately noted that appellate courts should be limited
in their scope of review."" Rather than decide the merits of the case, a review-
ing court should concentrate on whether the NLRB followed fair and proper
procedures in making its determination .I" This would effectively allow the
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 111-112 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
108. 103 S. Ct. at 2174-75 (Brennan, J., concurring).
109. The Court's analysis only indirectly mentioned the two other bases for dismissal. Id.
at 2169-70.
110. Id. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring); see supra notes 17, 35, 47 and accompanying
text. See generally Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Concerted Trespassary
Union Activity, 83 HARV. L. REV. 552 (1970) (discussing the need to balance state and federal
interests in determining whether trespass cases should be preempted); Cox, Labor Law Preemp-
tion Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972) (analyzing the evolution of the preemption doc-
trine in labor cases).
I11. 103 S. Ct. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring).
113. See generally 2 THE DEVELOPiNO LABOR LAW chs. 29-32 (C. Morris ed. 1971) (discuss-
ing congressional policy of granting jurisdictional power to the NLRB in labor-management
areas in order to achieve a uniform national policy).
114. 103 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring).
115. In a footnote, Justice Brennan compared the NLRB to another administrative agency,
the Federal Elections Commission, and emphasized the importance of allowing the NLRB great
deference in making its decisions. Id. at 2174 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring). Quoting the Court's
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NLRB enough deference to formulate a cohesive labor policy. Justice Bren-
nan's approach of discouraging judicial intervention in labor management
areas is also appropriate because, otherwise, inconsistent state decisions would
disrupt a unified body of federal labor law.
Both the Court's opinion and the concurrence recognized that past Supreme
Court decisions had allowed the states to decide matters of local concern," 6
even though those matters were arguably within the NLRB's jurisdiction."'
In those cases, the Court held that Congress had not manifested its intent
to exclude matters of local concern from state court jurisdiction." 8 For ex-
ample, the Linn Court recognized the inequity that might result if a state
court was deprived of deciding a well founded lawsuit when important state
interests were at issue." 9 To prevent this inequity, the Linn Court attempted
to balance the state and federal interests.' 0
The Bill Johnson Court employed a balancing test similar to the one
adhered to by the Linn Court.' 2 ' Although recognizing that the NLRB has
language in FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981), Justice Brennan
stated that "the NLRB [like the FEC] is also 'precisely the type of agency to which deference
should presumptively be afforded."' 454 U.S. at 37.
116. The Court noted, however, that it would not be unlawful for the NLRB to enjoin a
state court action if it is found to lack a reasonable basis. 103 S. Ct. at 2170. The Court
stated that a "plaintiff in a baseless suit has not suffered a legally-protected injury" and thus,
no state interest exists to protect its citizens. Id.
117. Id. at 2169-70, 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953). See generally Houton, The Excep-
tional Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. L.J. 49 (1975) (discussing the numerous exceptions to the
preemption doctrine).
118. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966). The Bill Johnson Court noted
that in these cases, as well as in other cases involving matters of local concern, Congress had
not intended to overlook the state's interest in protecting the safety and welfare of its citizens.
103 S. Ct. at 2170 (quoting Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290,
302-03 (1977)).
119. 383 U.S. at 64-65 (1966). Had the Linn court upheld the enjoining of the state civil
suit, the plaintiff would have been denied relief for his injuries due to the NLRB's limited
remedial powers. Linn involved allegedly defamatory statements made by the union and two
of its officials against a representative of an employer during a union organization campaign.
Id. at 55-56. The NLRB may set aside the election under the NLRA in a situation similar
to the one present in Linn. In doing so, however, the NLRB looks to whether the statements
were misleading or coercive, not whether they were defamatory. See Bok, The Regulation of
Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 38 (1964). If the statements are found to be defamatory, a state court may award
damages for libel. Linn, 383 U.S. at 67. The NLRB cannot, however, award damages or pro-
vide the defamed party with other appropriate relief. Id.
120. 383 U.S. at 59. The Linn Court noted that since the NLRA does not prevent parties
from uttering defamatory statements, state jurisdiction of the libel claim would be only a
"peripheral concern" of the NLRA. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959)).
121. 103 S. Ct. at 2170. The Bill Johnson Court noted that in view of the first amendment
right of access to the courts, the states have a strong interest in adjudicating civil actions which
have a reasonable basis. Thus, the Court observed that the NLRB's interpretation of the NLRA,
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been allowed great deference in effectuating federal labor policy, the Bill
Johnson Court stated that an allegation of defamation is primarily a matter
of state concern.' 2 Accordingly, the Court balanced the state's interest in
hearing the employer's claim against the NLRB's interest in protecting the
employee's federally guaranteed rights.' 3 Both the Court and Justice Bren-
nan concluded that, in the absence of any congressional direction, a libel
claim arising in the course of a labor dispute was merely a collateral con-
cern to the NLRB. 24 That is, a libel claim would not interfere with the
NLRB's adjudication of the related unfair labor practice charge because the
NLRB was not created to resolve libel claims.' 5 The Court, therefore, deter-
mined that a compromise was necessary to satisfy both the federal and state
interests. The Court held that the state's interest in hearing the case over-
rides the federal interest in effectuating national labor policy if the NLRB
determines that a suit has a reasonable basis.' 2 If, however, the NLRB deter-
mines that the suit lacks a reasonable basis, the federal interest overrides
the state's interest in adjudicating the suit.' 7
IMPACT
Despite the Bill Johnson Court's claim that libel suits are only collateral
to labor law, allowing libel suits to proceed when they arise in a labor con-
text could have a significant effect on labor policy. After Bill Johnson,
which would allow the NLRB to preempt the state's power to hear the suit, would be unjust
if the suit had a reasonable basis. Id.
122. Id. at 2169 (citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 65
(1966)). In a footnote, the Court stated that libel claims are not completely governed by state
law since the United States Constitution imposes a malice requirement. Id. at 2172 n.13 (citing
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1966)).
123. Id. at 2170. In addition to balancing the state and federal interests, the Court implicitly
engaged in another balancing test involving two conflicting first amendment rights. An employer's
first amendment right of access to the courts and an employee's first amendment right of free
speech were competing concerns in Bill Johnson. The Court concluded that in cases where
the speech is defamatory, the right of free speech must yield to the right of access to the
court system since defamatory speech is not protected under the first amendment. Id.
Justice Black's dissent in Linn presented an alternative view regarding libel in labor con-
texts. 383 U.S. at 67-68 (Black, J., dissenting). In Linn, Justice Black felt that libel suits should
be prohibited in labor disputes because such suits could curtail speech in the labor law field.
Id. (Black, J., dissenting). He believed the right to speak freely needed the utmost protection.
Justice Black concluded that chilling of speech would disrupt the collective bargaining process
and would clearly be contrary to the first-amendment. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
124. 103 S. Ct. at 2169-70, 2175 (Brennan, J., concurring).
125. Justice Brennan stated that the standard the NLRB applies when deciding an unfair
labor practice charge differs from the standard applied when deciding whether to enjoin a state
suit. Id. at 2175 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, the possibility of the state suit interfering
with the NLRB's administration of the NLRA is not substantial where the conduct in the state
suit is unrelated to the NLRB proceedings. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (libel); Allen Bradley Local Ill v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (mass picketing).
126. 103 S. Ct. at 2170-71.
127. Id.
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employer lawsuits may arise that would seriously impair employees' right
to unionize, but the NLRB would be powerless to enjoin."' For example,
employees may be inhibited from voicing their opinions on working condi-
tions or other work related matters protected by the NLRA if they fear that
they might be faced with a libel suit.' 9 Conceivably, employers who are
anti-union may wish to suppress their employees' activities by forcing them
into state court to defend themselves.' 30 The effect may be to intimidate
employees and deter their involvement in certain activities protected by the
NLRA. Following Bill Johnson, therefore, employers may have the power
to limit speech and other employees' rights in the workplace indirectly through
state civil suits.
Prosecuting such suits is typically not a problem for the employer because
litigation costs are generally tax-deductible as a business expense.'3
Employees, however, are not afforded this tax benefit. Moreover, employees
typically do not have the same resources available as employers to bear the
costs of litigation.' 32 Consequently, the time and costs of potential litigation
may pose an insurmountable problem for employees who wish to exercise
their right to engage in activities protected under the NLRA.
Despite the potential for abuse by employers, the Court's rule lessens the
likelihood of abuse enough to balance fairly between the competing federal
and state interests. It is significant that only those suits that are meritorious
or contain a "reasonable basis" are beyond the power of the NLRB to
enjoin."' The NLRB still has power to enjoin suits that do not meet the
threshold requirement of having a reasonable basis for the suit, thus pro-
tecting employees' rights. Yet, the Court's analysis also protects the
employer's first amendment right of access to the courts by allowing the
128. Under the Court's ruling in Bill Johnson, the NLRB would be unable to dismiss those
suits which contain a reasonable basis. Id. at 2173. According to Arthur Fox, an attorney
with the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, the reasonable basis requirement would
not be difficult to fulfill since one must only establish that genuine factual or legal issues exist.
Hentoff, Libel and Labor, 47 PROGREssIvE 25, 27 (1983) (quoting Arthur Fox). Fox stated
that "any plaintiff's lawyer can always frame a ... complaint in sufficient detail to preclude
its being dismissed as baseless." Id. at 27.
129. In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), the Court
noted that the NLRB does tolerate inaccurate statements by the union during organizational
campaigns. Id. at 60. The NLRB leaves it to the voter's discretion to decipher the truthfulness
of the statements. Id. at 60 (quoting Stewart-Warner Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1153, 1158 (1953)).
The Linn Court noted that terms like "scab," "unfair," and "liar" have been tolerated by,
the NLRB in the past. Despite the fact that they might be false or defame someone, such
statements are still protected by § 7 of the NLRA. Id. at 60-61. Nevertheless, statements which
intentionally seek to defame an individual and are knowingly false fall outside the protection
of the NLRA. Id. at 61.
130. Even the Court recognized that an employee who exercises his rights may be "subjec-
ting himself to the possiblity of a burdensome lawsuit." 103 S. Ct. at 2169.
131. For a discussion of the possible adverse impact of Bill Johnson, see Hentoff, supra
note 128, at 27.
132. Id.
133. 103 S. Ct. at 2170. The Court observed that the "states have only a negligible interest,
if any, in having insubstantial claims adjudicated by their courts, particularly in the face of
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state court to adjudicate a valid libel claim. 3 ' Therefore, the NLRB's power
to resolve labor disputes is not usurped by the state court whenever an
employer files a civil suit. But neither is an employer's right to sue eliminated
solely because his cause of action arises in the context of a labor dispute.
CONCLUSION
The approach taken by the NLRB and the courts in the past with regard
to employers' lawsuits against employees who had filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges was confusing and uncertain. The Court's decision in Bill Johnson
finally established a uniform standard for the NLRB and the courts to apply
in the future. Under the Court's new standard, the NLRB may dismiss a
state suit that is found to be "frivolous." If, however, the suit has merit,
the state court may proceed and try the case.
In view of the important first amendment right of access to the judicial
system, the Court struck a reasonable balance between the competing state
and federal interests. The Court correctly observed that an employer's first
amendment right of access to the courts can not be overlooked merely because
the tort arose in a labor dispute. Moreover, the Court's ruling allows the
NLRB to dismiss frivolous suits, negating the possibility of employers bringing
spurious claims solely for the purpose of retaliating against employees who
exercise their protected rights.
Because employer lawsuits may inhibit employees in the exercise of their
federally protected rights, the NLRB still retains the ultimate authority in
determining the reasonableness of the employer's lawsuit. This ensures ade-
quate protection of the employees' federal rights. To further ensure that
employees' federal rights are protected adequately, Justice Brennan's con-
currence urges the courts to allow the NLRB great deference in making its
"reasonable basis" determinations.
Justice Brennan's concurrence covers all the circumstances where the NLRB
may appropriately dismiss a state suit, and therefore, should provide guidance
for lower federal courts which determine whether to dismiss an employer's
state suit. Justice Brennan's concurrence is also significant because it
emphasizes the importance of allowing the NLRB great deference in deciding
matters affecting labor and management relations. This deference is essen-
tial to implement an effective uniform labor policy. To hold otherwise would
hinder the NLRB from acheiving its goal of a national labor policy.
In view of these concerns, both the Court and Justice Brennan reached
the strong federal interest in vindicating the rights protected by the national labor laws." Id.
134. See Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 641 (1961). Michelman suggests that in libel cases, an employer should be entitled to
receive the same remedies for libel and slander regardless of the fact that the libel occurs within
a labor context. Id. at 667. He further notes that state courts are better equipped than the
NLRB to decide libel and other state-related issues. Also, Michelman observes that permitting
state courts to adjudicate civil suits causes very little interference with the nation's labor policy.
Id.; see also NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973) (Court rejected argument that NLRB
was a more suitable forum than a state court to determine the reasonableness of a union fine).
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an equitable result by giving more weight to an employer's first amendment
right of access to the courts when the focus of the employer's state lawsuit
is a matter of only collateral concern to the NLRB. Under these particular
circumstances, the Court properly concluded that an employer has an
undeniable right to file a state suit.
Georgia L. Vlamis
